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The role of information in conflict escalation

Name
Constantine
Surname
Sorokin
Scientific organization
New Economic School, NRU Higher School of Economics
Academic degree
PhD
Position
Senior Research fellow (NES CSDSI)
Scientific discipline
Humanities & Social sciences
Topic
The role of information in conflict escalation
Abstract
We consider a continuous incomplete information escalation game. We assume that two competitors are engaged in a brinkmanship game such that at any
moment each of them can either continue escalation or back down: if the escalation level reaches some threshold (unknown to the players), disaster (war) breaks
out. We derive two comparative statics results. First, as contesters become less
certain about the value of the benefit from winning the conflict, the probability
of peace increases. Second, as players' signals grow more positive-dependent,
the probability of war increases.
Keywords
Summary
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